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Griffin: Property Law - Waiver of Closing Date in Land Sales Contracts in

PROPERTY LAW-WAIVER OF CLOSING DATE IN LAND
SALES CONTRACTS IN NORTH CAROLINA-Fletcher v.
Jones
INTRODUCTION

Under North Carolina law, where no time has been fixed for
the expiration of a land sale contract, the parties have a judicially
implied right to perform their contractual duties within a reasonable time from the contract's closing date.' Whether a party's performance after the closing date is within a "reasonable" time depends upon the purposes that the parties intended to accomplish
and other circumstances of the particular case.2
Parties to a land sale contract can provide for the contract's
expiration on the closing date by making time of the essence to
their contract.' A time of the essence provision means that one
party's performance on time is a condition of the other party's
duty to perform. 4 When a land sale contract contains a closing date
and time is of the essence to the closing, the contract expires if a
party does not perform at the closing date.
Two conflicting legal consequences result when a seller makes
oral assurances to perform his contractual obligations after the
closing date. First, where time is not of the essence and the seller
purports to terminate the contract, a court can view the seller's
oral assurances as some evidence of whether his purported termination was reasonable.' In contrast, when the contract explicitly
provides that time is of the essence, the seller's oral assurances to
perform beyond the closing date are irrelevant as the contract expires by its terms on the closing date.
To prevent this conflicting result, when time is of the essence
to the contract, courts often hold the seller's oral assurances of
1. Scarborough v. Adams, 264 N.C. 631, 641, 142 S.E.2d 608, 615 (1965).
2. United States v. 969.46 Acres of Land, Chatham County, N.C., 386 F.
Supp. 793, 798, (M.D.N.C. 1974), aff'd, 535 F.2d 1251 (4th Cir. 1976).
3. See Douglas v. Brooks, 242 N.C. 178, 87 S.E.2d 258 (1955). The parties can
also provide for the contract's expiration on a specific date by including an expiration date in the contract.
4. 3 A. CORBIN, COR3IN ON CONTRACTS, § 722 at 380 (1960).
5. Fletcher v. Jones, 69 N.C. App. 431, 436, 317 S.E.2d 411, 415 rev'd in part,
314 N.C. 389, 333 S.E.2d 731 (1985).
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later performance to be a waiver of the time of the essence provision.' When the time of the essence provision is deemed waived by
the seller, the parties have a reasonable time to perform from the
contract's closing date.
In Fletcher v. Jones,' the North Carolina Supreme Court held
that a seller who made oral assurances to a buyer of his intent to
comply with the terms of a land sale contract after the closing
date, where time was not of the essence, waived the closing date.
The court then held that a reasonable time for performance was
computed from the date the buyer had notice that the seller was
ready to close.'
This Note will demonstrate that the Fletcher court erred in
holding that a land sale contract closing date could be waived. This
Note will show that the court misapplied the doctrine of waiver to
a land sale contract closing date, the court erroneously concluding
that the seller was estopped from contending that reasonable time
for performance should be computed from that date. Additionally,
this Note will also show that the court modified the contract closing date for the purpose of computing a reasonable time for performance, a result that the parties themselves could not have
reached without a written modification of the closing date that
complied with the Statute of Frauds. The Note discusses the impact of the Fletcher decision and concludes that the court's application of waiver to a closing date was an unwarranted abandonment of the rule that performance be within a reasonable time
from the closing date.
THE CASE

In August 1980, the buyer and seller entered into a land sale
contract for three lots located in Dare County."0 The contract was
subject to a condition that either the seller obtain an absolute divorce from his wife or his wife agree to co-execute a deed with the
seller-husband."1 The contract provided for closing on January 9,
6. Warner Co. v. MacMullen, 381 Pa. 22, 112 A.2d 74 (1955) (treatment of
land sale contract as in force after closing date was waiver of time of the essence
provision).
7. Wagner v. Consolidated Realty Corp., 210 N.C. 1, 7, 185 S.E. 421, 424
(1936).
8. Fletcher v. Jones, 314 N.C. 389, 333 S.E.2d 731 (1985).

9. Id.
10. 69 N.C. App. at 432, 317 S.E.2d at 412.
11. 314 N.C. at 390, 333 S.E.2d at 733. At the time of the contract, the seller
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1981. 12 On the closing date the condition was not satisfied. The
parties created a written addendum, extending the closing date to
March 10, 1981. The condition remained unsatisfied on that date.1 3
Two weeks later, the seller requested another extension of the closing date." The buyer agreed to extend the closing to June 10,
1981.5 However, the seller did not sign the written extension
agreement. Later, the seller assured the buyer that he would be
ready to close after his divorce was final. In addition, the seller's
attorney assured the buyer's attorney that the seller intended to
close on the property.1 6
On August 4, 1981, the seller notified the buyer that he was
ready to close, but neither party arranged for a specific closing
date." In mid-September, the seller accepted a third party offer
for the three lots. 8 The buyer received a letter from the seller declaring their contract null and void. 19 The buyer notified the seller
of his intent to enforce the contract and tendered under the contract's terms. 20 The seller refused to convey the property. The
buyer sued for specific performance and special damages because
of his reliance on the contract.2 The seller pleaded the Statute of
Frauds as a defense to the unsigned written extension of the
March 10 closing date and contended that the "plaintiff's failure to
tender performance after all conditions and extensions of the contract had expired" rendered the contract void.2 2
The trial court granted the buyer's request for specific perwas involved in a domestic dispute with his wife.
12. Id. The purchase price for the three lots was $45,000.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 391, 333 S.E.2d at 733. The seller requested the extension on
March 23, 1981.
15. Id. There were no other written communications between the parties after the unexecuted written addendum.
16. Id.
17. The seller's attorney called the buyer's attorney and told him that the
divorce and property settlement were final and that the seller was ready to close.

Id.
18. The purchase price under the third party contract was $67,500. Id.
19. The buyer received the letter on September 24, 1981. Id.
20. Id.
21. 314 N.C. at 342, 333 S.E.2d at 734. Plaintiff Jones sought special damages
for expenses incurred for the property's development. The trial court denied the
expenses. The buyer also filed a lis pendens on the property on September 28,
1981.
22. The seller counterclaimed that the buyer's filing of lis pendens constituted a cloud on title. The trial court denied the counterclaim. Id.
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formance 2' but did not make a specific finding on whether the
buyer had tendered within a reasonable time from the March 10
closing date.2 4 The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the
seller's oral assurances to perform beyond March 10 were invalid
as a modification of that closing date.25 The court of appeals remanded the case for determination of whether a reasonable time
for performance had elapsed from March 10 to the time of the
seller's purported termination in September.2 6
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
seller's oral assurances constituted a waiver of the March 10 closing date. 7 The court held that the buyer had tendered within a
reasonable time from August 4, 1981, the date the buyer had notice
28
that the seller was ready to close.
BACKGROUND

In North Carolina, land sale contracts and their modifications
must be in writing and must meet the other requirements of the
Statute of Frauds.29 The written memorandum is required to prevent frauds and perjuries in land sale transactions." The traditional exception to the requirement of strict compliance with the
Statute is where its use would perpetrate a fraud upon the other
party.3 Although an oral agreement to extend a land sale con23. Id.
24. 69 N.C. App. at 436, 317 S.E.2d at 415 (1984).
25. Id at 435-36, 317 S.E.2d at 414.
26. Id.
27. 314 N.C. 389, 333 S.E.2d 735.
28. Id. at 396, 333 S.E.2d at 736.
29. All contracts to sell or convey any lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them, and all leases and contracts
for leasing land for the purpose of digging for gold or other minerals, or
for mining generally,of whatever duration; and all other leases and contracts for leasing lands exceeding in duration three years from the making thereof, shall be void unless said contract, or some memorandum or
note thereof, be put in writing and signed by the party to be charged
therewith, or by some other person by him thereto lawfully authorized.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-2 (1965). For modifications see Westmoreland v. Lowe, 225
N.C. 553, 35 S.E.2d 613 (1943) (modifications of land sale contracts required to be
in writing).
30. Winberry v. Koonce, 83 N.C. 351 (1880).
31. See Loeb v. Gendel, 23 Ill. 2d 502, 179 N.E. 7 (1961) ("courts of equity
will not permit the Statute of Frauds . . .to be used where the effect will be to
accomplish a fraud"). Id. at 505, 179 N.E. at 9.
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tract's closing date is within the Statute of Frauds, a seller may
not raise the Statute as a defense to the invalid oral modification
where the seller, before the closing date, requested the extension
for his benefit even though the contract included a time of the essence provision.3 2
In Alston v. Connell,33 the buyer and seller entered into an
option contract for the sale of land, time being of the essence to
the option.3 4 Before the option's expiration date, the seller requested a one-year extension of the option.3 5 The buyer agreed,
but the modification was not reduced to a writing. When the buyer
tendered under the option's terms within the time fixed by the oral
modification, the seller refused to accept. 3 The court held that
where the option's expiration date was extended at the seller's request, for his convenience, and all the circumstances clearly implied that the seller intended to comply with the option's other
terms, the seller could not raise the Statute of Frauds as a defense
to the invalid oral modification. 7 Otherwise the seller could use
the Statute to commmit fraud against the buyer. 8
Similarly, the court in Johnson v. Noles30 held that where the
seller orally agreed to a six-day extension of an option contract so
that the buyer's attorney could remedy certain title defects, the
seller could not invoke the Statute of Frauds as a defense to the
invalid oral modification of the option's expiration date. The seller
contended that the oral extension was without consideration and
void under the Statute.4" The court disagreed, holding that the
oral extension was for the seller's benefit because the seller could
32. Alston v. Connell, 140 N.C. 485, 53 S.E. 292 (1906).
33. 140 N.C. 485, 53 S.E. 292 (1906).
34. Generally, time is of the essence in option contracts. See Bateman v.
Kramer Lumber Co. 154 N.C. 248, 70 S.E. 474 (1911).
35. 140 N.C. at 491, 53 S.E. at 294.
36. Id.
37. Id.
The proposition that one party to a contract should thus discharge himself from his own obligations by inducing the other party to give him
time for their performance is, to say the least, very startling, and, if well
founded, will enable the defendants in this case to make use of the statute of frauds ...

to commit a fraud upon the plaintiff.

Id. (quoting from Hickman v. Haines, 10 L.R.-C.P. 598, 603 (1875)).
38. 140 N.C. 493, 53 S.E. 294.
39. 224 N.C. 542, 31 S.E.2d 637 (1944).
40. Id. at 545, 31 S.E.2d at 639.
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not give a good warranty deed on the option's expiration date.41
The Alston and Johnson decisions support the proposition
that a seller, under an option contract where time is of the essence,
will not be allowed to raise the Statute of Frauds as a defense to
an invalid oral modification of the expiration date, given before the
option expires, for the seller's benefit or convenience, and where
the circumstances clearly indicate that the seller intended to comply with the option's other terms.2
In Wagner v. Consolidated Realty Corp.,' 3 the court held that
letters sent by a seller to a buyer after the closing date, indicating
his intent to comply with the other terms of a land sale contract
(time being of the essence to the closing) was a "waiver" of the
essence provision. In Wagner, the seller contended that a land sale
contract expired on the closing date when time was of the essence
to the closing. 44 The court found that the seller's letters evidenced
an intent to comply with the other terms of the contract after the
closing date and held that the seller waived his right to enforce the
time of the essence provision.' 5 The waiver of the essence provision
"restored in the [buyers] the right within a reasonable time to consummate the purchase."' 6
Traditionally, waiver has been defined as the intentional relinquishment of a known right.' 7 When one party has a right to expect performance of a contract on time, he relinquishes that right
if he intentionally leads the other party to believe that the right
48
will not be enforced.
41. Id., 31 S.E.2d at 640.
42. In Harvey v. Linker, 226 N.C. 711, 40 S.E.2d 202 (1946), the court held
that where the seller had orally agreed to extend the option date and reduce the
purchase price, the Statute of Frauds could be used as a defense to the buyer's
action for specific performance. The court found that the purchase price was a
material term of the option contract that could only be modified in compliance
with the statute.
43. 210 N.C. 1, 185 S.E. 421 (1936).
44. Id. at 7, 185 S.E. at 424.
45. Id.
46. Id. (emphasis supplied).
47. See Danville Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Gallivan Bldg. Co., 177 N.C. 104, 97
S.E. 718 (1919); Fetner v. Rocky Mount Marble & Granite Works, 251 N.C. 296,
302, 111 S.E.2d 324, 328 (1959). The essential elements of a waiver are: (1) the
existence, at the time of the alleged waiver, of a right, advantage or benefit; (2)
the knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish such right, advantage or benefit. Danville, 177 N.C. at 106, 97
S.E. at 720.
48. A time of the essence provision gives the parties the right to expect per-
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Waiver has also been defined as the "excuse of the non-occurrence or of a delay in the occurrence of a condition of a duty.'

9

A

time of the essence provision means that "performance on time [by
one party] is a condition of the other party's duty" to perform. 0
Therefore, a time of the essence provision is a "condition of a
duty."
Under either definition of waiver, a time of the essence provision can be excused or "waived" in a land sale contract where there
has been conduct by one party after the closing date that has led
the other to believe that the time for performance has been extended."1 In Shoreham Developers Inc. v. Randolph Hills, Inc.,52
the Maryland Court of Appeals held that a seller's request for the
extension of a land sale contract's closing date and further oral assurances to comply with the terms of the contract after the closing
date was a waiver of the contract's time of the essence provision.
The seller contended that an oral modification of the closing date
was invalid under the Maryland Statute of Frauds.5 3 The Maryland court held that even if the oral modification was invalid, the
conduct by the seller was sufficient to effect a waiver of the contract's time of the essence provision."
ANALYSIS

In Fletcher v. Jones,55 the North Carolina Supreme Court
held that a closing date can be waived by a seller who made oral
assurances to a buyer of his intent to perform beyond the closing
date. The court further held that computation of reasonable time
for performance began on the date that the buyer had notice that
formance no later than the date set for closing. After the closing date, the right
can be relinquished by conduct demonstrating an intent to comply with the contract's other terms.
49. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, § 8.5, at 561 (1982).
50. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 4, at 380.
51. [T]he courts have a fondness for treating certain conduct as a
"waiver" rather than a "modification." By characterizing the conduct as
a "waiver" rather than a "modification", a court may avoid three requirements for a modification: the requirement of assent, the requirement of a
writing under the Statute of Frauds, and the requirement of consideration or detrimental reliance.
Fletcher, 314 N.C. at 394 n.2, 333 S.E.2d at 735 n.2 (1985).
52. 248 Md. 267, 235 A.2d 735 (1967).
53. Id. at 273-74, 235 A.2d at 740.
54. Id. at 275-76, 235 A.2d at 741.
55. 314 N.C.389, 333 S.E.2d 731 (1985).
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the seller was "ready to close." ' Justice Mitchell, dissenting in
part, felt that the case should be remanded because the trial court
did not apply the proper legal standard to the facts for determining whether a reasonable time had elapsed from the March 10,
1981 closing date to September 24, 1981, the date of the seller's
5 7
purported termination.
The North Carolina Supreme Court misapplied its definition
of waiver in Fletcher.The court defined waiver as the "excuse of a
non-occurrence or a delay in the occurrence of a condition of a
duty. ' 58 The contract in Fletcher did not contain a time of the
essence provision. In fact, there was no condition in the parties'
contract that required performance to be on the closing date.6 0 The
closing date was merely a date set by the parties, viewed as "an
approximation of what the parties regard[ed] as a reasonable time
[for closing] under the circumstances of the sale."'6 ' The court
erred by holding that the closing date was a waivable "condition of
a duty" because the closing date was not binding as a condition on
either parties' duty to perform.
The court cited Tantillo v. Janus62 and Kimm v. Andrews63 as
authority for defining a waiver. A brief review of these cases will
demonstrate that the North Carolina Supreme Court misapplied
its definition of waiver to the closing date in Fletcher where time
was not of the essence.
In Tantillo, the sellers contended that the buyers had not redeemed a promissory note within the time allotted for redemption
where time was of the essence to the contract.6 4 The Tantillo court
found that the sellers waived their right to enforce a time of the
essence provision in their contract because the sellers knew of the
buyers' tardiness in complying with the redemption requirement
56. Id. at 395, 333 S.E.2d at 735.
57. Id. at 400, 333 S.E.2d at 738 (Mitchell, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part). Justice Mitchell found that no specific finding of reasonable time for
performance supported the trial judge's conclusion that the buyer was entitled to
specific performance.
58. Id. at 395, 333 S.E.2d at 735 (emphasis supplied).
59. Id. at 393, 333 S.E.2d at 734.
60. The Fletcher contract did not contain an expiration date.
61. 314 N.C. at 394, 333 S.E.2d at 735, (quoting from Drazin v. American Oil
Company, 395 A.2d 32, 34 (D.C. Ct. App. 1978)).
62. 87 Ill. App. 3d 231, 408 N.E.2d 1000 (1980).
63. 270 Md. 601, 313 A.2d 466 (1974).
64. 87 111. App. 3d at 234-35, 408 N.E.2d at 1003.
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for several months before declaring the contract null and void.6 5
In Kimm, the sellers were unable to comply with a condition
precedent before the closing date, time being of the essence to the
closing. 6 However, the sellers conveyed to the buyers under the
terms of the original contract after the closing date.6 7 The Kimm
court held that the parties' subsequent conduct, evidencing an intent to comply with the original contract and in fact resulting in a
settlement, was a waiver of the time of the essence provision. 8 The
plaintiff in Kimm was a third-party purchaser under a later contract with the sellers, and the court held that the waiver of the
essence provision was effective against him."9
The Tantillo and Kimm decisions do not support the Fletcher
holding that a mere closing date is a waivable condition. By holding that the seller waived the March 10 closing date, the Fletcher
court estopped the seller from contending that a reasonable time
for performance should be computed from March 10.
A.

The Sole "Condition of a Duty"

In the Fletchercontract, the only condition that preceded the
parties' duties to perform was that the seller obtain an absolute
divorce or his wife agree to co-execute a deed.7 0 This condition is
commonly referred to as a condition precedent. A condition precedent is a fact or event occurring after the making of a valid contract that must exist or occur before there is a right to immediate
performance.7 The seller in Fletcher was under no duty to convey
the three lots until the condition precedent had occurred. In a
footnote, the court found that the contract's closing date governed
72
the time within which the condition precedent had to be fulfilled.
Since time was not of the essence to the closing, the parties had a
reasonable time in which the condition precedent had to be
73
fulfilled.
The existence of the condition precedent misled the court in
its application of waiver to the contract's closing date. In the por65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 237-38, 408 N.E.2d at 1005.
270 Md. at 608, 313 A.2d at 470.
Id. at 609, 313 A.2d at 471.
Id. at 623-24, 313 A.2d at 478.
Id. at 627, 313 A.2d at 480.
314 N.C. at 390, 333 S.E.2d at 733.
3 A. CORBIN, supra note 4, at 628.
314 N.C. at 393 n.1, 333 S.E.2d at 734 n.1.
Id.
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tion of the opinion defining waiver, the court stated: "[C]onduct
such as continuing performance with knowledge that the condition
has not occurred might be questionable as the manifestation
needed for a modification but sufficient for a waiver. ' 74 This statement sheds light on how the court erred by holding that the closing date could be waived. Although the seller gave the buyer several assurances that he would comply with the contract beyond the
March 10 closing date, the condition that prevented the seller from
closing was the condition precedent. There was no condition that
required closing to be on the closing date. 75 Therefore, the only
condition that fits the court's definition of waiver was the condition precedent. The court did not hold that the condition precedent was waived. In fact, the condition precedent could not be
waived because the seller could not convey full title to the property
until the condition was met.
The court held that the seller waived the closing date by his
conduct subsequent to that date.76 Since the closing date was not a
condition, the court's definition of a waiver as an excuse of a condition of a duty was inappropriately applied to the closing date.
B.

A More Traditional Application of Waiver

The Fletcher court could have avoided holding that a closing
date was a waivable condition of a duty by applying a more traditional definition of waiver to prevent the seller from contending
that the reasonable time for performance began on the March 10
closing date. In North Carolina, waiver is traditionally defined as
the intentional relinquishment of a known right.7 7 Since time was
not of the essence to the Fletcher contract, the parties were subject
to the general rule that closing be within a reasonable time.
The general rule of a reasonable time to perform after the
closing date is an implied right in all land sale contracts where no
expiration date has been set.7 The implied right belongs to both
buyer and seller. The Fletcher court could have determined that
74. Id. at 394, 333 S.E.2d at 735 (quoting from E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, §
8.5, at 562 (1982)) (emphasis supplied).
75. Recall that the parties in Fletcher did not set a specific date for the contract's expiration.
76. 314 N.C. at 395, 333 S.E.2d at 735.
77. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 49, at 561. See also Pierce v. American Fidelity Fire Insurance Co., 240 N.C. 567, 83 S.E.2d 493 (1954).
78. 314 N.C. at 394, 333 S.E.2d at 734. See Scarborough v. Adams, 264 N.C.
631, 142 S.E.2d 608 (1965).
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the seller waived his implied right to close within a reasonable time
from the closing date based on his conduct after March 10. The
seller's conduct could satisfy the requirement that relinquishment
of the right be intentional because the seller could expect that his
oral assurances would lead the buyer to believe that time for performance had been extended beyond the March 10 closing date.
Had the court found that the seller intentionally relinquished the
implied right to close within a reasonable time from the March 10
closing date, the seller would have no right to assert regarding reasonable time for performance. The court could then justify its
holding that a reasonable time for performance be computed from
the date on which the buyer had notice that the seller was ready to
convey.
C. Judicial Modification of the Closing Date
The Fletcher court held that a closing date can be waived by a
seller who makes oral assurances to a buyer of his intent to perform beyond the closing date. Although a closing date should not
be subject to waiver, a trial court can now apply Fletcher to avoid
application of the general rule that a reasonable time for performance be computed from the closing date. By finding a waiver of a
closing date based on subsequent conduct, a trial court can compute reasonable time for performance from the date that the assured party has notice that the other party is ready to close. The
real impact of the Fletcher decision is to allow the trial court to
modify the contract's closing date for purposes of computing reasonable time for performance, achieving what the contracting parties could not without executing a modification in compliance with
the Statute of Frauds.
CONCLUSION

The Fletcher court held that a seller can waive the closing
date in a land sale contract where time is not of the essence. 79 Although the North Carolina Supreme Court defined waiver as an
"excuse of a non-occurrence or a delay in the occurrence of a condition of a duty,"8 0 the court erred by applying this definition of
waiver to a closing date because the date was not a condition. After
finding a waiver of the closing date, the court created a new rule
79. Id. at 389, 333 S.E.2d at 731.
80. Id. at 394, 333 S.E.2d at 735.
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for computing reasonable time for performance. Reasonable time
for performance does not begin on the contract's closing date in all
cases. 8 ' Rather, once a waiver of the closing date has been found,
reasonable time for performance will be computed from the date
that the assuring party gives notice that he is ready to close.82 This
new rule allows a court to modify a contract's closing date for the
purpose of computing reasonable time for performance.
The court could have held that the seller waived his implied
right to close within a reasonable time under a more traditional
definition of waiver. Alternatively, the court could have simply remanded the case for further findings on the issue of reasonable
time for performance from the March 10, 1981 closing date. Under
either alternative the court would have avoided its confusing holding that a closing date is a waivable condition of a duty.
Ricky L. Griffin

81. Id.
82. Id.
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